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ARE FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES REALLY VALUE ENHANCING? 







This paper investigates the relationship between the use of financial derivatives and firm 
value in the Australian setting. Contrary to expectations, we find that the use of 
derivatives in general, and the use of interest rate derivatives in particular, are negatively 
related to firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q). The existence of this derivative user 
‘discount’, combined with strong prior evidence that corporations are primarily 
motivated by value-enhancing goals, suggests a need for managers to focus serious 
efforts into explaining their value-driven strategies to the financial market and to do so in 
a timely manner.   
21.   Introduction 
The literature over the last few decades, surrounding the role of risk management as an 
important arm of corporate policy, suggests that the use of financial derivatives can be a value 
enhancing activity. Several studies have provided evidence that risk management programs 
undertaken by corporations are generally not influenced by managerial motives to maximize 
their personal wealth through the firm’s hedging activities, but are guided by value enhancing 
motives. In the Australian context, see for example, Nguyen and Faff (2002), Berkman, 
Bradbury, Hancock and Innes (2002) and Heaney and Winata (2005). While substantial 
research effort has been devoted to ascertaining whether firm hedging behaviour is consistent 
with one hedging theory or another, little research outside of the US has been undertaken to 
document the direct relationship, if any, between firm value and the use of financial 
derivatives.  
Accordingly, in this paper we extend the literature by testing the hypothesis of whether 
the use of financial derivatives by Australian firms is rewarded by a higher market value. This 
research question is of particular interest as on the one hand, some recent authors suggest that 
corporate use of derivatives may not be sufficient to achieve economic importance (Guay and 
Kothari, 2003), while on the other hand a value premium has been associated with the 
corporate use of these instruments (Allayannis and Weston 2001, Carter, Rogers and Simkins 
2006). Using a simple measure of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for (relative) firm value, we thus 
provide a thorough examination of the impact of the use of financial derivatives and the extent 
of such usage on firm value for a sample of Australian publicly listed companies over the 
period of 1999 – 2000. 
We choose to examine this important research question in the context of Australian 
corporations for a range of reasons. First, there has been an increasingly prevalent use of 
financial derivatives in Australia over recent times. While figures on over-the-counter 
1transactions are not available, the volume of contracts being traded on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange has recorded a continuous growth in the last few years.
1 Second, unlike most other 
developed nations, Australia has a strong resources corporate sector which explains a large 
dollar value of commodity derivative contracts. The differing pattern in the types of derivative 
instruments that are used may very likely have an impact on the relationship between firm 
value and derivative usage.  
Third, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board has made significant progress in 
devising accounting standards that govern the disclosure of derivative information. In 
particular, FASB 133 – Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities was 
first issued in June 1998 in the US and required US corporations to recognize all financial 
derivatives including embedded financial derivatives in the balance sheet. In contrast, up to 
2006, the presentation and disclosure of derivative usage in Australia, as governed by AASB 
1033, only require derivatives holding to be reported in the Notes to the Financial Statements 
if the amounts are material.
2 There is also a certain degree of inconsistency in the nature of 
the reported derivative information. For example, some Australian corporations report the 
gross value of derivative contracts while some others only report the fair value of their 
derivative positions. Additionally, the reported figures reflect the balance at the time of 
reporting and inferences cannot be made about derivative positions that are undertaken during 
the year and subsequently closed out before the reporting date. This relatively poor reporting 
practice makes it difficult for users of financial statements to assess the overall risk profile of 
the reporting entity.
3 As a result, during our sampling period, Australian investors appear to 
                                                 
1 According to the Sydney Futures Exchange Annual Volume Report (2005), the total number of contracts being 
traded increased by 5% in 2000, 14.6% in 2001, 1.1% in 2002,  23.5% in 2003, 20.4% in 2004 and 18.1% in 
2005. 
2 In line with development of global accounting standard governing firms’ disclosure of derivative holdings, the 
Australian Accounting Standard Board (AASB) introduced ASSB139 in 2004 for adoption in 2005. AASB139 
provides a framework for derivative instruments to be recognized and measured. In particular, all derivatives 
instruments are recognized as assets or liabilities at fair value. 
3 However, this problem is not exclusive to Australia. Derivative holdings are reported at year end and as such 
they are a stationary rather than a dynamic measure.  
2face a higher degree of information asymmetry with regard to corporate use of financial 
derivatives as opposed to their US counterparts. As such, lessons can be drawn from the 
Australian case that will be relevant and applicable in other similar settings around the world. 
Finally, due to the small size of the domestic financial markets, Australian corporations are 
more reliant on foreign currency denominated debt as a source of financing which exposes 
such companies to foreign exchange rate risk that is an obvious target for hedging with 
financial derivatives.
4   
In direct contrast to the prediction that the use of derivatives is associated with a 
‘hedging premium’, our findings suggest that if anything financial markets that are more 
prone to information asymmetry impose a ‘discount’ on derivative users. Specifically, as a 
group, derivatives users appear to have a lower Tobin’s Q, compared to their non-user 
counterparts. When partitioning aggregate derivative use into interest rate, foreign currency 
and commodity derivatives, we find that the hedging discount is mostly related to the use of 
interest rate derivatives (IRD). Both the incidence and the extent of IRD usage are associated 
with a lower firm value. The results relating to commodity derivatives (CD), on the other 
hand, are not robust to the inclusion of the control variables. Notably, the use of foreign 
currency derivatives is not found to have any discernable impact on firm value, although there 
is some suggestion that an increase in the extent of foreign currency derivative usage is 
related to a lower Tobin’s Q.  
We also investigate the robustness of our findings by analysing particular sub-samples 
of firms that are more likely to have significant exposures to: (a) exchange rates (firms with 
foreign sales); (b) interest rates (firms with long-term debt); and (c) commodity prices 
(resources firms). Our results are quite robust in that the use of IRD is generally not value 
                                                 
4 Nguyen and Faff (2006) reported that 18.71% of their Australian sample has foreign currency denominated 
debt in the capital structure and 90 % of this debt is denominated in USD. Furthermore, while a majority of US 
firms (70%) has a foreign debt to total debt ratio of less than 20% (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003), the comparable 
figure for Australian firms is 55% with a foreign debt ratio less than 20% (Nguyen and Faff, 2006). 
3enhancing. However, we do find some evidence that the use of commodity derivatives by 
resources firms is viewed favourably by the market, although its economic significance is 
questionable. Nevertheless, this finding is important for a resource-based economy like 
Australia.   
Our limited success in establishing a relationship between the use of foreign currency 
derivatives and firm value, contrasts Allayannis and Weston (2001) who reported that the use 
of these instruments among a sample of 720 large US non-financial firms has a positive 
impact on firm value.
5 They documented a hedging premium of 4.87% of firm value for firms 
with positive foreign sales. Our finding of a hedging discount seems even more paradoxical 
given the background of prior Australian evidence that corporations are primarily motivated 
by value-enhancing goals. Nevertheless, the value enhancing property of financial derivatives 
is still an empirical debate as more recent research have suggested that the potential 
relationship can be either insignificant (Lookman 2004; Jin and Jorion 2006) or negative 
(Callahan 2002).  
One plausible explanation of the negative relationship between derivative usage and 
firm value is that Australian investors predominantly face a certain degree of information 
asymmetry with regard to corporate usage of financial derivatives. Corporate hedging is 
potentially an indicator of information asymmetry due to the firm specific nature of the 
hedging program. First, each firm has a unique exposure profile which is a function of their 
underlying operating and financing activities, and second different hedging techniques are 
available to manage different types of risks. Information concerning the amount and timing of 
exposure are privileged to the firm in most cases. Additionally, details regarding one firm’s 
hedging program has little informational value to investors in an attempt to evaluate another 
firm’s hedging program. For example, knowledge regarding Coles Myer’s usage of IRDs 
                                                 
5 It is uncertain, however, whether the use of interest rate and commodity derivatives by US corporations would 
lead to an increment in firm value as Allayannis and Weston (2001) only consider the use of foreign currency 
derivatives in their study. 
4provides little insight into the risk management program of its close competitor David Jones. 
On the one hand, David Jones may choose to finance its business differently, thereby 
exposing itself to a different type and degree of interest rate risk. On the other hand, it may 
choose techniques other than IRDs to hedge interest rates. Consequently, unless firms clearly 
communicate to market participants the nature and extent of their underlying exposures, the 
timing and magnitude of their derivative positions, investors are likely to face a certain degree 
of information asymmetry. 
 Notably, the current Australian reporting standards provide limited information about 
firms’ underlying exposures and no information about the timing of derivative positions. As 
such, it seems that Australian investors are unable to make an informed judgement of whether 
firms (in principle and/or actuality) truly use derivatives for hedging purposes. They, 
therefore, place a discount on the value of derivative users although from a corporate 
viewpoint, these risk management strategies may aim at delivering an increment in 
shareholders’ value. Accordingly, there is an important implication of our results to corporate 
management, namely, to seriously consider better ‘selling’ and credibly explaining derivative 
strategies so that their shareholders and investors generally fully appreciate the potential value 
add of such actions. Of course, many firms will intentionally wish to suppress such 
information in order to minimise advantage being given to their competitors. To the extent 
that this is of concern, our evidence gives some measure of the ‘opportunity cost’ attached to 
remaining ‘secretive’ about derivative activity.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
brief literature review on risk management and the use of financial derivatives. Section 3 
describes our data and outlines the variables employed. Section 4 reports and discusses the 
results. Finally, a conclusion is offered in Section 5.  
 
52.  Review of the Literature 
Although the empirical evidence has generally been mixed, prior research provides a 
reasonably good understanding of the reasons underlying the use of financial derivatives. 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Graham and Smith (1999), for example, provide 
evidence in support of the tax incentives to hedge. The stance that firms hedge in response to 
the threat of financial distress is also widely supported. Dolde (1995), Haushalter (2000), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Tufano (1996) all find some evidence that firm leverage is 
associated with a greater likelihood that a firm will make use of derivative instruments and/or 
a higher intensity of usage. As far as the underinvestment hypothesis is concerned, empirical 
results regarding the relationship between hedging and liquidity appears to be more consistent 
than any other hypothesis. Apart from Berkman and Bradbury (1996) who fail to document 
such a relationship, all major studies report that high liquidity is significantly related to a 
lower incidence of derivative usage and/or more gentle usage intensity. The relationship 
between the use of derivatives and the existence of growth options, on the other hand, is 
controversial. While Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Dolde (1995) find a positive 
relationship between growth and the likelihood of hedging, Mian (1996) and Marsden and 
Prevost (2005) report the converse relationship.  
However, the most striking characteristic of corporate hedging, as documented in many 
existing studies, is an underlying value enhancing motive.
6 With the exception of Berkman 
and Bradbury (1996) and Tufano (1996) who provide some evidence that corporate risk 
management is influenced by poorly diversified managers who hedge on the firm account to 
maximize their personal wealth, numerous studies suggest that such managerial behaviour is 
generally non-existent (Geczy, Minton and Schrand 1997, Haushalter 2000).  In Australia, 
Nguyen and Faff (2002) find no evidence of managerial risk aversion influencing the decision 
                                                 
6 It can be argued that there are certain costs associated with hedging. However, for the purpose of analysing the 
value enhancing property of financial derivatives, we assume that hedging costs remain constant. 
6to use financial derivatives. Studies undertaken using UK data also suggest that corporate 
usage of derivatives is to offset risk (Hardwick and Adam, 1999) and to minimize the impact 
of foreign exchange fluctuations on cash flow from operations (Joseph and Hewins, 1997; 
Mallin, Ow Yong and Reynolds, 2001). 
The potential value-enhancing role of financial derivatives is also supported by other 
studies that reach a consensus that the corporate use of financial derivatives is for hedging 
purposes. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) report that exchange rate exposure is significantly 
reduced via the use of foreign currency derivatives in a sample of US firms. Crabb (2002) also 
concludes that corporate hedging successfully mitigates exchange rate exposure. By looking 
at the risk level resulting from the use of financial derivatives, Guay (1999) and Hentschel 
and Kothari (2001) lend further support to the argument that firms use derivatives to hedge. 
They provide evidence that such usage does not appear to expose firms to an excessive level 
of risk, which is likely to result from speculative activities.  
To our knowledge, in the first published paper that investigates a direct relationship 
between firm value and the use of financial derivatives, Allayannis and Weston (2001) report 
that the use of derivatives is indeed value enhancing as foreign currency derivative users in 
their sample enjoy a hedging premium of around 4.87% of firm value. In a more recent paper 
that focuses on the airline industry, Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) support the finding of 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and report a hedging premium associated with fuel hedging of 
14%. Nevertheless, Lookman (2004) and Jin and Jorion (2006) examine the risk management 
practices of U.S. oil and gas producers and fail to find a significant relationship between 
commodity derivatives and firm value. Additionally, Callahan (2002) investigated a sample of 
North American gold mining firms and reported that there is a negative correlation between 
the extent of gold hedging and the performance of firm stock price.  
7In the current paper, we aim to provide an out of sample extension by testing the cross-
country generalisability of Allayannis and Weston’s (2001) result using a sample of 
Australian firms. Moreover, we extend the literature by including tests beyond a foreign 
currency derivatives (FCD) focus, namely to also separately investigate interest rate 
derivatives (IRD), commodity derivatives (CD), as well as an aggregate measure of all 
derivatives instruments.  
 
3.   Data and Methodology 
3.1  Data 
Our sample is selected from the Connect4 database that covers the 500 largest Australian 
firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Consistent with many previous studies 
that establish the role of financial firms as the market makers/dealers in the derivative market, 
we choose to focus on analysing firm market value of non-financial firms only. Property 
Trusts and Investment and Financial Services providers are however included in the sample as 
they tend to be end users of derivative products. As an initial step, we study the Notes to 
Financial Statements of each individual firm to classify a company as either a derivative user 
or non-user.
7 In cases where there is no reference to derivative activities, the firm will be 
classified as a non-user. For every derivative user, the total notional value of all derivative 
contracts is used to proxy how active that user is in the derivative market. On average, sample 
firms have an extent of all derivative usage of 45.29%, FCD usage of 9.84%, IRD usage of 
8.90% and CD usage of 20.67%.
8  
                                                 
7 The accounting standards governing the disclosure of financial derivatives during the sampling period require 
that public companies disclose off-balance-sheet financial instruments in their Notes to the Financial Statements. 
As a result, a company can be identified as a derivative user if it reports the use of any of the following 
instruments: options, swaps and futures/forwards. 
8 Although being used by approximately 18% of all derivative users, commodity contracts show a huge 
contracting value, representing almost 83% of the value of total derivative holdings by the sample firms. This 
explains a high average usage of commodity derivatives and represents a distinct characteristic of our sample 
compared to US studies. 
8  The sample obtained from Connect4 was then articulated with the Datastream 
database to obtain data on the market value of equity. This procedure produces a final sample 
that consists of 428 firm/year observations, of which 217 observations relate to 1999 and the 
remainder to 2000.  
  
3.2  Variables 
3.2.1  Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is firm market value, as proxied by a simple type of Tobin’s Q 
measure. Specifically, this simple Tobin’s Q measure is calculated as the sum of total 
liabilities and market value of equity divided by total book assets. Market value of equity is 
obtained from Datastream while the book value of assets and liabilities are taken from firm 
financial reports as recorded by Connect4. In undertaking this exercise we assume that the 
market value of liabilities is equal to the book value. We choose to use a simple Tobin’s Q as 
opposed to a more complex Tobin’s Q (for example, as measured in a fashion described by 
Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, and/or Perfect and Wiles, 1994) for two main reasons. First, 
simple Tobin’s Q has been shown to be highly correlated with more complex Tobin’s Q 
proxies, the measurement of which requires an estimation of the replacement costs of assets. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), for example, report that the correlation coefficient between 
simple Tobin’s Q and complex Tobin’s Q is 0.93, while Daines (2001) suggests that similar 
results are obtained using a simple Tobin’s Q and one constructed using the Perfect and Wiles 
(1994) approach. Second, simple Tobin’s Q does not require a large data input and has been 
used widely as an effective measure of firm value (Lemmons and Lins 2003; Daines, 2001). 
Moreover, replacement cost data is not available for Australian firms making the calculation 
of Tobin’s Q impossible. As a result, simple Tobin’s Q has been a popular measure used to 
proxy for firm value in previous Australian studies (Farrer and Ramsey 1998). 
9 
3.2.2  Independent variables 
The main independent variables that we use in our tests are measures of whether a firm uses 
financial derivatives or not and in the case of a user, the extent to which derivatives are used. 
To proxy for the incidence of derivative usage, we use a dummy variable which equals unity 
if a firm uses at least one form of financial derivative and zero otherwise. The extent of usage 
is calculated as the total notional value of derivative contracts scaled by firm size where firm 
size is defined as total book assets. We also partition the aggregate use of financial derivatives 
into FCD, IRD and CD usage and develop a dummy variable for each type of derivative. The 
extent of FCD, IRD and CD usage is defined as the total notional amount of FCD, IRD and 
CD contracts outstanding, respectively, scaled by total assets.  
 
3.2.3  Control Variables 
To identify the impact of financial derivatives on firm value, we consider a number of factors 
that have been documented in the literature. These control variables are described below: 
a. Firm Size: Although the relationship between firm size and firm value is 
ambiguous, it is a common practice to include firm size as a control variable (Daines, 2001; 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Lang and Stulz, 1994). There is some evidence 
indicating that firm size is negatively related to firm value (Daines, 2001; Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001). To proxy for firm size, we use the log of total assets. 
b. Leverage: Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that capital structure may have an 
impact on firm value. An excessive level of debt will increase the threat of financial distress 
and thus lead to a decline in firm value. Similarly, Rees (1997) reports a negative relationship 
between total debt and value in a UK sample. To account for the effect of leverage, we use the 
ratio of long term debt to total assets. 
10c. Liquidity: Hedging theories predict that firms with ample internal funds can avoid 
the cost of raising external funds to undertake positive NPV projects. As a result, liquidity is 
expected to be positively associated with firm value. We use the ratio of corporate cash and 
cash equivalents holding to total assets as a proxy for a firm’s liquidity. 
d. Profitability: Following Allayannis and Weston (2001), we control for profitability 
by including the return on assets (ROA) variable. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net profit 
after tax and before abnormal items to total assets.  
e. Growth: Prior research (Smith and Watts, 1992; Yermack; 1996; Sougiannis; 1994; 
Green, Stark and Thomas; 1996) suggests that firm market value is a positive function of a 
company’s future investment opportunities. Following the procedure adopted in Yermack 
(1996), we use capital expenditure as a measure of the availability of investment 
opportunities. For consistency, we scale capital expenditure by total assets.  
f. Industrial Diversification: To control for any ‘diversification effect’, we include in 
our regressions an ‘industry segment’ variable. This variable indicates the number of 
industrial segments in which the firm operates. In our sample, 63.08% of firms operate in no 
more than one industrial segment. On the other hand, only 7.24% of firms operate in more 
than five industrial segments.  
g. Geographical Diversification: In contrast to industrial diversification, geographical 
diversification has been argued by Carter, Panzalis and Simkins (2001) to be value enhancing. 
Generally, firms with a widespread network across countries are more capable of setting up 
operational hedges to manage long-term economic exposure. We measure the degree of 
geographical diversification among our sample firms by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
(FSTS). Approximately 37.6% of our sample firms have positive foreign sales.  
11h. Managerial Ownership: According to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), firm 
value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, is positively related to managerial ownership. We measure 
managerial ownership as the percentage of shares held by directors and executive officers. 
A summary of the variables being used in our study is provided in Table 1.  
4. Findings 
4.1  Basic Regression Results 
A potentially important issue that may impact our chosen research design is the possible 
endogeneity across our variables. That is, a number of control variables can be thought of as 
potentially jointly determined with various types of derivative usage. We have a two-pronged 
attack regarding this endogeneity issue. Our first response is more indirect and basically 
recognises that in the event of a number of control variables being jointly determined with 
various types of derivative use, a multicollinearity problem is induced since all these variables 
are explanatory variables. To test for the potential impact of multicollinearity, we run the 
basic regression model with derivative usage and extent of usage as the only explanatory 
variables: 
i i i u DevUse a a TobinQ + + = 2 1      (1) 
i i i e ExtentUsag b b TobinQ π + + = 2 1        (2) 
where  TobinQ is the proxy for firm value and calculated as the sum of total liabilities and 
market value of equity divided by total assets; DevUse is a dummy variable equal to unity if a 
firm uses financial derivatives and zero otherwise; and ExtentUsage is the ratio of the notional 
value of derivative contracts to firm size. 
12We then include the control variables to explain the variations in Tobin’s Q that can 


















2 2 1  (4) 
where Xi is a vector of the control variables. The control variables include: firm size, liquidity, 
leverage, ROA, growth, industry segments, FSTS, managerial ownership. The definitions of 
these variables can be found in Table 1.  
  Returning to the issue of endogeneity, we engage the second arm of our response in 
the context of these more fulsome models. Specifically, to address the potential problem of 
endogeneity where there is reverse causality between Tobin’s Q and the control variables we 
conducted a Hausman (1978) test. In particular, we regressed the suspected endogenous 
variable on its lag and the residuals from this regression are used in the main regression to 
detect endogeneity. Since it is not obvious which control variable would suffer from 
endogeneity, in unreported results we conduct the test for all control variables. Most notably, 
the results show that in all instances, the coefficients associating with the residual variables 
are not statistically significant. We can therefore confidently conclude that the results of our 
regression models (3) and (4) are not affected by endogeneity.
10
We also test for the potential impact of the use of each type of financial derivative on 
firm value by replacing the aggregate derivative dummy with dummy variables representing 
                                                 
9 In the context of linear information dynamics, if financial derivatives are employed to alter the risk profile of a 
firm, pooling the data across users and non users can cause a model mis-specification by forcing the coefficients 
to be equal when, in fact, they are not (Ohlson, 1989). Accordingly, we investigated this issue by estimating 
versions of our model that include a full set of interactive dummy variable terms to distinguish users from non-
users. Notably, very few of these terms were found to be statistically significant and, where they were, no 
distinct pattern was evident – consistent with spurious significance. As such, this justifies the use of the 
parsimonious version of our model as reported in the paper. 
10 Details, while suppressed to conserve space, are available from the authors upon request. 
13the use of individual derivatives, namely FCD, IRD and CD. The results of all these 
regressions are presented in Panels A and B of Table 2.   
The most important finding evident from Panel A of Table 2 is that, instead of having 
a positive impact on firm value, the use of financial derivatives in our sample firms is 
associated with a statistically significant reduction in firm value. In contrast to many 
empirical findings that support the value-enhancing role of financial derivatives, our results 
show that the market has a negative perception towards firms that use derivatives and 
discount the value of the firm accordingly. Nevertheless, a more detailed examination reveals 
that the hedging discount is related to the use of IRD and CD while the use of FCD appear to 
bear little statistical relationship to firm value.  
It should also be noted that the hedging discounts reported for IRD, CD and aggregate 
users are not only statistically significant but also economically important. On average, a 
derivative user has a Tobin’s Q which is lower than that of non-user by a magnitude of 0.39 
while a IRD user (CD user) show a lower Tobin’s Q of the magnitude of 0.35 (0.21). 
Although this result does not suggest that the use of derivatives leads to a 39% reduction of 
firm value, it indicates that derivative users have a firm value which is approximately 25% 
lower than that of derivative users (based on an average Tobin’s Q across our sample of 
around 1.5). In the presence of control variables the results, as reported in Panel B of Table 2, 
show that the value destroying relationship between aggregate users and IRD users remain, 
however, with a lower degree of economic significance. The use of derivatives is associated 
with a lower Tobin’s Q of the magnitude of 0.271 which is equivalent to 18% hedging 
discount (again relative to an average Tobin’s Q of 1.5). Additionally, we notice that the value 
harming property of financial derivatives appears to be mostly attributable to IRD, as the 
coefficients on the FCD and CD variables are not statistically significant. It appears that our 
14evidence of a hedging discount is robust and that the degree of information asymmetry faced 
by derivative users is severe.  
The results relating to the control variables as shown in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) 
of Panel B reveal that firm value is a positive function of firm size. This finding, while 
consistent with Yermack (1996), is in contrast to Allayannis and Weston (2001) who report 
that a larger firm is associated with a lower Tobin’s Q. In contrast to our expectation of a 
positive relationship between liquidity and firm value, we find a thread of evidence that 
liquidity is negatively related to firm value. Despite a small coefficient, this result suggests 
that the market is concerned with possible managerial adverse actions driven by an agency 
motive in highly liquid firms. To lend further support to the role of financial leverage in 
affecting firm value, we find that leverage is negatively related to firm value. Intuitively, the 
market perceives a firm to be less valuable when it has more debt, possibly due to the threat of 
financial distress. Our finding, while qualitatively similar to Allayannis and Weston (2001), is 
more economically persuasive.
11 In contrast to our prediction that growth opportunities are 
associated with a higher firm market value, our regression results show that firms which 
spend more on capital expenditure have an inferior Tobin’s Q. In a manner consistent with 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Panel A of Table 2 further suggests that the degree of industrial 
diversification appears to be hurting firm value while geographical diversification (proxied by 
foreign sales) has no impact on firm value. Finally, the positive association between 
managerial ownership and firm value suggests that managerial ownership is effective in 
aligning managerial interests to that of shareholders. 
Interestingly, we fail to document a relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm 
profitability (ROA). The independence of firm value from its profitability seemingly 
contradicts many US and UK studies that provide supporting evidence of a positive 
                                                 
11 Allayannis and Weston (2001) found that the debt to equity ratio has a statistically significant impact on 
TobinQ in the pooled regression. However, the coefficient estimate of 0.000 suggests that in terms of economic 
significance, an increase or decrease in the leverage ratio hardly has any impact on firm value. 
15relationship. However, a closer examination of the data reveals that the lack of a significant 
relationship between firm value and ROA is mainly due to a small subset of the sample that 
consists of unprofitable firms. In particular, when the regressions are run on the sub-sample 
with positive ROA, the results show a strong positive relationship between firm value and 
ROA.  For firms that are not profitable, Tobin’s Q hardly improves when there is a marginal 
improvement in the relative negativity of ROA.
12  
Consistent with some UK studies that do not include a size variable in cross sectional 
regressions to explain firm value (Rees, 1997; Green, Stark and Thomas, 1996; Sougiannis 
1994) we test the robustness of our results by excluding the size variable in our regressions. 
As can be seen from Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Panel B, this model specification reduces 
the statistical significance of the results. However, our results are robust to the extent that the 
use and the extent of IRD usage are still found to be associated with lower market value. 
Generally, our results are quite robust across different settings. This suggests that market 
participants are largely consistent in the assessment of firm value after taking into account 
corporate use of financial derivatives.  
In Panels C and D of Table 2, we extend the analysis by examining the potential 
relationship between the extent of derivative usage and firm value. The results, as presented in 
Panels C and D, are essentially similar to that of Panels A and B. Specifically, the extent of 
derivatives employed by firms is found to be value destroying especially in the case of IRD. 
Once again the coefficient on the extent of IRD usage variable is not only statistically but also 
economically significant. The relationships between Tobin’s Q and the control variables 
remain qualitatively unchanged. In general, we find strong evidence that both the use and the 
intensity of usage of financial derivatives, especially IRD, have a negative impact on firm 
                                                 
12 The results of these regressions are not reported to conserve space but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
16value. In short, the derivative user discount is a strong finding emanating from this stage of 
our analysis. 
 
4.2  Extended Analysis 
In this section, we continue to explore the relationship between derivative use and firm value 
by examining specific groups that are more likely to have significant exposure to particular 
financial risks than others. Specifically, we hypothesize that the use of derivatives is more 
likely to be value enhancing if firms use derivatives in a manner aligned to the type of 
exposure that they have. Consistent with this line of reasoning, we rerun Equation (1), 
allowing for the FSTS variable to be applied interactively with variables proxying for 
corporate use of FCD. Firms that have greater sales denominated in foreign currencies are 
expected to have a more inherent economic exposure to fluctuations in exchange rates. 
Assuming a hedging motive, the use of FCD should therefore be value enhancing for these 
















3 3 2 1 * (6)  
Definitions of variables are the same as in earlier models except that the control variables no 
longer include FSTS. We hypothesize that the coefficients on the interactive variables are 
positive.  
Similarly, we test the hypothesis that the use of IRD is value enhancing for those firms 
that have greater inherent interest rate exposure. The interactive variables in this case are 
IRDUse*Leverage and ExtentIRD*Leverage. Finally, for the case of commodity derivatives, 
we use an interactive dummy variable that equals unity if a firm is a resources firm and zero 
otherwise. It is expected that resources firms are more exposed to fluctuations in commodity 
17prices in the course of their business dealings and therefore, the use of CD should add value 
for these firms.  
The outcome of these additional analyses is reported in Table 3 (noting that, to 
conserve space we do not report the coefficients on the control variables). According to the 
results presented in Panel A, the use of FCD continues to exhibit no statistical relationship 
with firm value. The coefficient on the interactive variable is neither statistically nor 
economically significant. The essence of this finding remains largely unchanged when we use 
a continuous variable, i.e. when ExtentFCD is used. These results reinforce our earlier 
findings that the use of FCD by Australian firms has no consequence for firm value. 
Panel B reports results relating to the case of IRD. Generally, with the introduction of 
the interactive variable, we are able to show that the negative relationship remains robust. 
Moreover, the act of using IRD (but not the intensity of use) among firms with higher 
financial leverage seems to bring an extra valuation penalty. As such, we fail to find any 
evidence that the use of IRD leads to an increase in firm value for those firms that are 
believed to have a greater inherent exposure to interest rates. These findings strongly defy the 
value-enhancing role of IRD and suggest that firms are either using IRD in a non-productive 
way or that the market makes a mistake in under-valuing these risk management strategies.  
Finally, in Panel C, we report the findings relating to the case of CD usage by 
resources and industrial firms. Our main finding is that for industrial firms both the use of CD 
and the extent to which CDs are used, is associated with an erosion of firm value. In contrast, 
the use and extent of usage of CD among resources firms has a neutral effect on firm value as 
the negative impact of the base variables are offset by the positive impact of the interactive 
variable. As such, while the use of CD by the subset of resources firms would have a very 
marginal impact on firm value, at least they seem not to erode value.  
 
184.3  Robustness Check: Portfolio Analysis 
In this section we aim to shed further light on the behaviour of Tobin’s Q in response to 
changes in the extent of derivatives that corporations use by undertaking a portfolio analysis. 
Basically, portfolio analysis allows one to make conclusions regarding the firm value of each 
portfolio relative to a base case. For this reason, we also refer to our portfolio regression as 
‘fixed effects model’ regression.  
This econometric approach involves portfolio dummy variables which are constructed 
based on the intensity of derivative usage. Specifically, all derivative users are partitioned into 
decile portfolios according to their level of derivative use while all non-users are grouped into 
Portfolio 0. By construction, Portfolio 1 comprises the least intensive derivative users while 
Portfolio 10 captures the most intensive users. Table 4 presents the financial characteristics 
corresponding to the portfolios.  
Most notably, we find that non-derivative users is the group that have the highest 
Tobin’s Q. Portfolio 2 firms have the second highest Q and this measure generally declines as 
firms use more and more derivatives (Portfolios 2 to 10) to a minimum of 1.19 for the most 
intensive derivative users (Portfolio 10). While this declining pattern is not monotonic, our 
general observation is that firms are not rewarded with a higher market value as they use more 
and more financial derivatives. Additionally, the firms that belong to Portfolio 0 are the 
smallest, have the lowest degree of leverage, are least profitable, operate in the least segments 
but are the second most liquid and have the highest ratio of managerial ownership.  
In Table 5, we present the results of our fixed effects regression (noting that, to 
conserve space we do not report the coefficients on the control variables).
13 Specifically, we 
estimate the following regression: 
                                                 
13 The relationship between Tobin’s Q and the control variables remain consistent throughout our empirical 
analyses. In essence, firm size and the degree of managerial ownership are value enhancing while liquidity, 










,      (7) 
where Pi,j is a dummy variable taking the value of unity if firm i belongs to Portfolio j and 
zero otherwise; Xi is a vector of the control variables. These control variables include: firm 
size, liquidity, leverage, ROA, growth, industry segment, FSTS and managerial ownership. 
  In Table 5, we report the coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the case where the 
benchmark portfolio is Portfolio 0. The coefficient estimates of Portfolio 1 to 10 allow 
conclusions to be made regarding the marginal impact of further derivative use on firm value 
after taking into account the control variables. In other words, Tobin’s Q of each portfolio is 
benchmarked against that of the base case portfolio being Portfolio 0. As can be gauged from 
the results, while being a low derivative using firm (Portfolios 1 and 2) does not seem to have 
a value impact, further derivative use is generally value destructive. In particular, there is 
evidence that firms belonging to Portfolios 3 to 10 have a Tobin’s Q that is statistically lower 
than that of Portfolio 0 firms. Initially, the discount seems to generally rise with the extent of 
usage, reaching a peak of 0.6 units of Tobin’s Q for Portfolio 6 (mean derivative usage of 
19.3%). Beyond that the discount falls somewhat, down to around 0.35 units for Portfolio 10 
(the highest derivative users in our sample), but notably remains statistically and 
economically important.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we address the question of whether the use of financial derivatives among a 
cross section of Australian firms delivers a positive increment in firm value. In doing so, we 
investigate both the relationship between an aggregate measure of derivatives and firm value 
as well as the impact that individual types of derivatives potentially have on firm market 
value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q.  
20Although many prior studies have suggested that the use of financial derivatives is 
value enhancing by taking advantage of many market frictions, we fail to find such a positive 
relationship between derivative use and firm value. Rather, our results strongly indicate that 
the use of derivatives in general and the use of interest rate derivatives in particular lead to a 
reduction in firm value or a ‘derivative user’ discount. The existence of such a discount 
appears to be robust to many alternative specifications including an analysis of the subsets of 
firms that are more likely to have inherent economic exposures to exchange rates, interest 
rates and commodity prices, respectively. Our portfolio analysis further shows that firms with 
a medium to high level of derivative usage tend to trade at a discount compared to firms that 
use a modest level of (or no) financial derivatives.  
Our evidence suggests that Australian investors, possibly due to information 
asymmetry, are unable to make an informed judgement of whether firms (in principle and/or 
actuality) truly use derivatives for hedging purposes. As such, they place a discount on the 
value of derivative users although from a corporate viewpoint, these risk management 
strategies may aim at delivering an increment in shareholders’ value. Indeed, paradoxically, 
previous evidence provides strong support for the value-enhancing hypothesis. Accordingly, 
there is an important implication of our results to Australian corporate management, namely, 
to seriously consider ways in which they can better ‘sell’ and credibly explain derivative 
strategies (while maintaining any commercial sensitivities) so that their shareholders and 
investors generally fully appreciate how and to what extent such actions create shareholder 
wealth.  
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Variable Name  Definition 
TobinQ  The sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by total assets 
Extent of Derivative usage  The total notional value of all derivative contracts scaled by total assets 
Extent of FCD usage  The total notional value of all FCD contracts scaled by total assets 
Extent of IRD usage  The total notional value of all IRD contracts scaled by total assets 
Extent of CD usage  The total notional value of all CD contracts scaled by total assets 
Size   Natural log of total assets 
Liquidity  The ratio of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
Leverage  Long term debt scaled by total assets 
ROA  Profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets 
Growth   Capital expenditure scaled by total assets 
Industry Segments  The number of industry segments in which the firm operates  
Foreign sales (FSTS)  The ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
Managerial Ownership  The number of shares held by directors and executive officers scaled by the total 





Derivative Use and Firm Value 
 
Panels A and C report the results of the following regressions, respectively: 
i i i u DevUse a a TobinQ + + = 2 1        (1) 
i i i e ExtentUsag b b TobinQ π + + = 2 1       (2) 

















2 2 1   
Tobin’s Q is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by total assets. DevUse is a dummy 
variable equalling unity if a firm uses derivatives and zero otherwise. ExtentUsage is the extent of derivative 
usage calculated as the total notional value of all derivative contracts scaled by firm size. Xi is a vector of the 
control variables: firm size, liquidity, leverage, ROA, growth, industry segment, FSTS and managerial 
ownership (defined in Table 1). Columns (2) to (4) in Panel A and Columns (3), (5) and (7) in Panel B report the 
results of Equations (1) and (3) with Derivative Use being replaced with a dummy variable equal to unity if a 
firm uses FCD, IRD or CD, respectively. Columns (2) to (4) in Panel C and Columns (3), (5) and (7) in Panel D 
report the results of Equation (2) and (4) with the Extent of derivative usage being replaced with the extent of 
FCD, IRD and CD usage, respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in Panels B and D report the results of 
Equations (3) and (4) with the size variable being excluded.  
 
Panel A: Derivative Use and Firm Value 
 
Predicted 
Sign     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 





Derivative Usage  +    -0.3883
a        
FCD  Usage  +       -0.0402      
IRD Usage  +            -0.3547
a   
CD  Usage +             -0.2088
b
R-squared        0.0341     0.0005     0.0397     0.0085 
Panel B: Derivative Use and Firm Value with Control Variables 
 
Predicted 
Sign  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





Derivative Usage  +  -0.2709
c -0.2070          
FCD Usage  +      -0.0634  -0.0110        
IRD  Usage  +      -0.3117
a -0.1687
b   
CD  Usage +        -0.0895  0.0085 




















ROA  +  -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0032 -0.0004 -0.0018 0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0006 














Foreign Sales  +  -0.0004  0.0001  -0.0008  -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0002 





R-squared      0.4130 0.3478 0.4029 0.3411 0.4273 0.3491 0.4034 0.3411 
25Table 2 (cont.) 
Panel C: Extent of Derivative Use and Firm Value 
 
Predicted 
Sign     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 





Extent Der Usage  +    -0.0010
a       
Extent of FCD   +       -0.0034
a     
Extent of IRD  +         -0.0059
b   
Extent of CD   +           -0.0007
a
R-squared     0.0187  0.0156  0.0275  0.0058 
Panel D: Extent of Derivative Use and Firm Value with Control Variables 
 
Predicted 
Sign  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





Extent Der Usage  +  -0.0003
c -0.0005
b       
Extent of FCD   +      -0.0003  -0.0005         
Extent of IRD   +          -0.0064
a -0.0072
a   
Extent of CD   +              -0.0003  -0.0004 
Size   ?  0.1624
a  0.1645
a   0.1620
a  0.1631
a  














ROA +  -0.0035  -0.0006  -0.0036  -0.0006 -0.0027 0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0006 














Foreign Sales  +  -0.0009  -0.0003  -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0003 





R-squared     0.4035  0.345  0.4019  0.3415 0.4094 0.3509 0.4027 0.3471 
a significant at 1% level 
b significant at 5% level 
c significant at 10% level 
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Table 3 
Additional Analyses of the Relation between Derivative Use and Firm Value 
















3 3 2 1 * (6)  
Tobin’s Q is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by total assets. FCDUse is a dummy 
variable equalling unity if a firm uses FCD and zero otherwise. ExtentFCD is the extent of FCD usage calculated 
as the total notional value of all derivative contracts scaled by firm size. FSTS is the ratio foreign sales to total 
sales. Xi is a vector of the control variables: firm size, liquidity, leverage, ROA, growth, industry segment and 
managerial ownership. Panel B focuses on IRDUse and ExtentIRD using Leverage as the interaction variable, 
while Panel C focuses on CDUse and ExtentCD using a Resources dummy variable as the interaction term. The 
coefficients on the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. 
Panel A: Foreign Currency Derivatives 
 Predicted  Sign  Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
Constant   0.1043  0.2385  0.1608  0.3620 
FCDUse +  -0.0318  -0.3553     
FCDUse* FSTS  +  -0.0019  -1.3076     
ExtentFCD   +      -0.0008  -0.9294 
ExtentFCD*FSTS +     0.0000  0.9392 
R-squared     0.4041     0.4023    
Panel B: Interest Rate Derivatives 
Constant   0.0207  0.0430  0.4103  0.8292 
IRDUse +  -0.0342  -0.2499     
IRDUse*Leverage +  -0.0157
a -6.2101    
ExtentIRD +      -0.0156
a -2.6911 
ExtentIRD*Leverage +      -0.0001  -0.8242 
R-squared     0.3074     0.2484    
Panel C: Commodity Derivatives 
Constant   -0.0361  -0.0802  0.0679  0.1543 
CDUse +  -0.2319
b -2.0603    
CDUse*Resources +  0.2220
c 1.8884   
ExtentCD +      -0.0043
a -2.9808 
ExtentCD*Resources +      0.0041
a 2.8164 
R-squared     0.4065     0.4064    
a significant at 1% level 
b significant at 5% level 




Portfolio Analysis – Financial Characteristics 
 
This table reports the financial characteristics of portfolios constructed based on the extent of derivative usage. Portfolio 0 consists of non-derivative users 
while derivative users are divided into decile portfolios. By construction, Portfolio 1 is made up of the least intensive derivative users while Portfolio 10 
comprises the most intensive derivative users. The F-stat is for an equality test between the means of the portfolios.  
Portfolio n 
Average 
Usage  TobinQ Size Liquidity  Leverage  ROA Growth Ind  Seg  FSTS ManOwn 
0 120  0.0000  1.8450  12.6440  11.2295  12.9857  2.2121  6.5099  1.5833  9.3826  14.9459 
1  30  0.3563  1.7421 13.0309  5.2575  18.1506 4.4027 5.2711  1.9000 12.0587  7.2744 
2  30  2.6726  1.7613 14.1333  5.9920  19.8168 6.6467 5.6331  1.8667 13.7806 11.2895 
3  30  5.7116  1.6998 14.1180  5.5668  19.4847 3.9310 6.0404  2.4000 16.8788 13.4597 
4  30  9.7425  1.4398 13.6425  2.5647  25.4727 5.2053 5.2708  1.6333 15.9583  6.5574 
5  30  13.8754 1.4068 13.6991  3.4955  23.9778 5.7171 8.0893  1.8000 11.9836  4.3935 
6  30  19.2750 1.1897 13.7176  3.8325  29.8863 4.6706 5.5982  1.8000 18.7328  6.1340 
7  30  26.2763 1.1345 13.6775  4.7921  35.2444 4.5913 5.7207  2.0000 9.0456  8.6075 
8  30  38.5304 1.1241 13.5919  6.1494  42.2148 4.7171 7.6465  2.4000 20.5537  6.2161 
9  30  76.9158 1.1974 13.5707  5.2531  33.6257 4.1602  11.2985  1.9000 14.7747  6.4393 
10  38  98.4357 1.1952 13.0378 11.4362  30.4752 4.3774  14.3972  1.6316 14.1669  6.1749 
                  
F-stat      5.1113  5.7533 2.6394  11.0206  0.9951  3.4577 1.3741  1.0527 2.2577 
p-value        0.0000  0.0000  0.0040  0.0000  0.4468  0.0003  0.1896  0.3981  0.0141 
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Table 5 
Derivative Use and Firm Value - A Fixed Effects Model 
 










,     (7) 
where Tobin’s Q is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by total assets; Pi,j is a 
dummy variable taking the value of unity if firm i belongs to Portfolio j and zero otherwise and Xi is a 
vector of the control variables. These control variables include: firm size, liquidity, leverage, ROA, 
growth, industry segment, FSTS and managerial ownership. The coefficients on the control variables are 
suppressed to conserve space. 
Variable  Predicted Sign  Benchmark Portfolio = 0 
    Coefficient t-stat 
Constant    0.0231 0.0544 
Portfolio1  +  -0.0540 -0.2651 
Portfolio2  +  -0.3402 -1.5700 
Portfolio3  +  -0.4823
b -2.5897 
Portfolio4  +  -0.4586
b -2.4512 
Portfolio5  +  -0.4850
a -3.1736 
Portfolio6  +  -0.6257
a -4.4886 
Portfolio7  +  -0.5944
a -3.8692 
Portfolio8  +  -0.3723
a -2.7687 
Portfolio9  +  -0.4329
a -2.8820 
Portfolio10  +  -0.3469
b -2.5116 
R-squared    0.4532    
a significant at 1% level 
b significant at 5% level 
c significant at 10% level 
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